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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent. :

Case No. 19559

•

vs.

:

JOSEPH P. ROCCO,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Priority 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of capital homicide in
the Second District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear

the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (1987).
STATMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did defendant waive any objection to the

photographs of the victim when he stated at trial that one of the
photographs was admissible but failed to specify which one was
not admissible and by failing to include the photographs in the
record on appeal?
2.

Was defendant prejudiced by admission of prior bad

acts or subsequent bad acts where the evidence was highly
probative of defendant's intent, knowledge and lack of mistake or
accident?
3.

Did the trial court err by failing to admonish the

jury of the purpose for Rule 55 evidence where there is no
authority requiring such an admonition?
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4.

Was there prosecutorial misconduct requiring

reversal of defendant's conviction where the evidence of
defendant's guilt through his own statements was overwhelming?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with numerous crimes
arising from a crime spree on February 1, 1983.

The trial court

severed all counts from the first-degree homicide charge which
was tried July 6, 1983 through August 9, 1983 before the
Honorable Calvin S. Gould, in the Second Judicial District Court,
in and for Weber County.

The jury convicted defendant of first-

degree murder on August 9, 1983. On September 8, 1983 Judge
Gould sentenced defendant to life in the Utah State Prison.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant and David Hanson burned David Stewart's
Riverdale home down around him on the night of February 1, 1983
(R. 797, 805, 1448).

Stewart, who was bound hand and foot, was

burned beyond recognition when defendant and Hanson splashed from
3 to 5 gallons of a thin, flammable liquid over Stewart and
trailed it across the floor, then lit it (R. 812-13, 930, 937,
1227).

Stewart died from extensive thermal burns (R. 1194).

His

dentist identified him from dental work he recognized as his own
(R. 1222).
At trial, there was much confusion over the manner in
which Stewart was tied and over what became of Stewart's left
hand and forearm.

Officer Morgan said Stewart's right hand was

wrapped with wire and also his legs, just below the knees (R.
812-13, 826-27).

He said there was no evidence Stewart was

•2-
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"hogtied" (R. 824-25).
"hogtied".

Detective Fuchs said Stewart was

He explained that an electrical wire, probably an

extension cord, was wrapped around Stewart's ankles and then
brought up behind him and wrapped around his right wrists,
drawing his legs up (R. 860-61, 864). Fuchs thought the wrist
wrapping was loose enough that it could have accommodated
Stewart's left hand, if it were there (R. 864). Dr. Reyser also
said that there was copper wire around Stewart's right wrist and
his ankles (R. 1196).

She said that at one time the wire had

been quite tight because skin tissue was preserved underneath it
on the wrist (R. 1213).

She did not agree that there was room

for another wrist within the wire (R. 1213).
Stewart's left hand and forearm were never found (R.
811, 886). His body laid on its left side when he was found (R.
863).

Underneath his body, remnants of a red ski parka were

preserved because it was protected from the fire by his body (R.
873, 935). The carpet underneath his body was also protected.
(R. 879, 935). A ring that Stewart wore on his left ring finger
was not found with the body (R. 780). These facts lead to an
inference that Stewart's arm was cut off before he was burned.
Two photographs of the body were introduced (R. 81112).

One of these showed the manner in which Stewart was tied

(R. 860-61).

The other showed debris over and around the body

which is obscured by smoke and Stewart's feet which were
described both as wearing boots and as being bare, but charred
(R. 842, 866-68).
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To establish defendant's intent to kill, the State
introduced his confession and evidence of an attempted murder
just moments after Stewart's house burned.

Defendant said that

after what happened at Stewart's, he was just drunk enough that
he -wanted to go ahead and do it again" (R. 1450-51).

Defendant

suggested to Hanson that they go to Neil Shock's home where they
kicked the front door in, tied Shock up on his bed with a vacuum
cleaner or electric blanket cord and lit the bed on fire (R.
1147, 1451-53).

Shock, who rolled off the bed before it was lit

on fire, managed to escape his burning bedroom (R. 1149, 1154).
Shock thought he smelled kerosene before the fire started and it
appeared that 1-2 quarts of flammable liquid was splashed on
Shock's bed and floor (R. 1158, 1167).
Defendant and Hanson took Shock's car from his home (R.
1152, 1456).

They decided to get rid of the car by burning it in

Ogden Canyon and used one-half to one gallon of a flammable
liquid to start the fire which completely gutted the car's
interior (R. 1170, 1456-57).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

Defendant waived any objection to the photographs

by failing to specify in the record which photograph he referred
to as inadmissible.

He stated he had no objection to one of the

two photographs but failed to identify which one was which on the
record.

Further, the photographs are not part of the record on

appeal for this Court to review.
Moreover, the photographs were of essential evidentiary
value because one of them depicted the manner in which the victim
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was bound.

An issue that was hotly contested by defendant.

The

witnesses' testimony on this issue was contradictory and
confusing.

Viewing the photograph became necessary for the jury

to settle this factual dispute which bore significantly on
defendant's mental state.
II.

The State did not offer evidence of the Goodwin

burglary in its case.

The prosecutor mentioned the burglary in

his opening statement but failed to introduce evidence on the
issue during trial, thus, the issue of whether this was
misconduct meriting reversal is treated in Point IV.
Officer Carpenter's mention that defendant knew
something about two ski resort burglaries was not evidence that
defendant committed those burglaries.

Even if the jury inferred

that defendant committed those burglaries, defendant was not
prejudiced because there is no reasonable likelhihood of a more
favorable outcome.
The evidence of defendant's involvement in an attempted
murder and arson at Neil Shock's home immediately after the
Stewart murder was highly probative on the issue of defendant's
intent and tended to prove absence of accident in the Hansen
murder and knowledge on defendant's part.

This evidence was

properly admitted under former Rule 45.
III.

Defendant fails to identify what evidence was

admitted in violation of former Rule 55 and has# therefore,
waived any objection he might have had by failing to provide
legal analysis on the issue.

Even if defendant had been more

specific, he admits that the evidence was admissible and claims
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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only that the jury should have been given a limiting instruction.
Defendant, however, fails to cite to any Utah authority requiring
such an instruction.
IV.

Defendant was not prejudiced by any alleged

misconduct of the prosecutor because evidence of his guilt was
overwhelming.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO THE
PHOTOGRAPHS ADMITTED AT TRIAL.
At trial, the State introduced two photographs of the
victim known as Exhibits J and K (R. 811-12).

These photographs

depicted the body of the victim as it appeared at the crime scene
upon discovery and after it had been rolled over onto a body bag
(R. 855, 860). On appeal, defendant argues that the prejudicial
effect of the photos outweighed their probative value and that
their admission was reversible error.

As demonstrated below,

defendant's argument fails because he waived any objection he
might have had by failing to make a sufficiently specific
objection and by failing to include the photos in the record on
appeal.
When the State offered the photos, defendant stated
that he had no objection to one of the photos but failed to
specify which one (R. 814). He went on to state that he thought
the cumulative effect of two photos was prejudicial and without
probative value.

Id.

Again, defendant did not state to which of

the two photos he objected.

When the court admitted both,

defendant reiterated that he did not object to one of them but
Digitized
the Howard W.
Hunterhe
Law Library,
Reuben Clark Law
School,
BYU.
did not specify
toby which
one
did J.object
(R.
815).
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After the State rested, defendant renewed his argument
about the photographs through a motion for mistrial (R. 1503-06).
Again defendant did not specify which photograph should not have
been admitted.

Instead, defendant shifted his focus claiming

that no photos should have been allowed because they served
merely to inflame the jury.

Neither did defendant's written

Motion for Mistrial and supporting memorandum (R. 557, 567, 57274# 589) explain that he objected to one of the photos in
particular.
From the record, it appears that the trial court may
have known which photograph defendant found objectionable because
defense counsel was referring to the photos as "this one" and
"that one."

(R. 814, 815). This Court, however, cannot

determine from the record with any degree of certainty to which
photograph defendant preserved an objection.
Moreover, because neither photo is part of the record
on appeal, this Court cannot even examine them.

Nevertheless,

even if both photographs were part of the appellate record, this
Court remains unable to determine to which photograph defendant
objected.

Any attempt to do so would be sheer speculation.
Because defendant failed to make a specific objection

on the record to sufficiently preserve the issue for review, he
has waived any objection he might have had.

State v. Kelly, 718

P.2d 385, 393 (Utah 1986) (Court will generally assume validity
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of trial court's actions where record is not entirely clear).
Also, defendant's failure to perfect the record on appeal should
operate as a waiver of the issue for appeal in any event.

State

v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771 (Utah 1985).
Finally, despite defendant's contrary assertion, the
photographs did possess essential evidentiary value.
v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986).

See State

Several witnesses

testified about the manner in which Stewart's body was bound.
These witnesses presented a confusing scenario wherein the right
arm either was or was not connected by wire to the ankles or
knees, the wire around the wrists was loose enough to accommodate
a second wrist or it was not, and that the wire between the
ankles or knees and the wrist was cut at the scene before the
photo was taken or was cut at the autopsy (R. 812-13, 824-27,
860-61, 864, 1196, 1213).
Evidence of the manner in which Stewart was found
illustrated the intent to kill in the care taken to ensure his
inability to escape.

It also was relevant to whether his left

arm was burned away by the fir€* or was severed prior to the fire
or perhaps prior to his being bound.

This also illustrated the

intent with which his assailants acted and eliminated the
possibility of accidental death.
Defendant argues that the photographs do not depict the
crime scene because Stewart was moved before one of them was
taken.

However, this photograph was described by a witness as

being taken at the scene, showing the body in the condition it
was in at the scene except that it had been turned over (R. 855).
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-8-

The witness pointed out the ligatures and noted their locations
using the photograph to illustrate his testimony (R. 860-861).
That the body was moved only increases the photograph's probative
value because the photograph was apparently intended to
illustrate evidence that could be viewed only if the body was
moved.
Again, it is important to note that the photograph is
not contained in the record and defendant merely alleges that it
has no value without citing to any record evidence to support his
claim.

A noted above, one witness used the photograph to

illustrate portions of his testimony that was disputed by other
witnesses.

The jury was free to inspect the photograph and

determine whether it did or, as defendant claims, did not clearly
show the position of the ligatures, their relative tightness and
whether they were connected.
With respect to the admission of photographic evidence,
this Court in State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983), set forth
the following rule:
We have frequently stated and applied the
rule that color photographs of the body of
the victim—even photographs that are
gruesome—are no inadmissible if they are
probative of essential facts, even though
they may be cumulative of other evidence.
663 P.2d at 63.

The Court added that "the key consideration in

the application of this rule has been the relevance of the
photographs.-

Jd.

Finally, it stated that the relevance of the

proposed photographs must be weighed against the risk of creating
undue prejudice:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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[T]he court should determine whether the
viewing of the photographs by the jury would
create a substantial danger of undue
prejudice against the defendant, and if so,
whether that danger substantially outweighs
the photographs' essential evidentiary value.
The more inflammatory the photograph, the
greater the need to establish its essential
evidentiary value, Commonwealth v.
Scaramuzzino, 455 Pa. at 381, 317 A.2d at
226, and, conversely, the more essential the
evidentiary value of the photograph, the
greater the defendant's burden to require its
exclusion on the basis that its inflammatory
nature would be prejudicial to him. The
point of the reference to "essential
evidentiary value" in the context of
potentially prejudicial photographs of the
victim's body is that such photographs would
generally be inappropriate where the only
relevant evidence they convey can be put
before the jury readily and accurately by
other means not accompanied by the potential
prejudice.
663 P.2d at 64 (emphasis in original).
As to the other photograph, defendant does not direct
any particular argument to it but merely claims generally that it
was inadmissible.

Without the photograph, it is difficult for

anyone to determine exactly what it depicts since there is no
testimony relating to it that clearly establishes anything except
that Stewart's feet are visible, the view is obscured by smoke
and his body is at least partially covered by debris (R. 842).
From this record it appears that the photograph was not
particularly gruesome and that the State was not required to
establish the high degree of probativeness required for gruesome
photographs.

See State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752-53 (Utah

1986).
Because defendant failed to preserve his objection at
trial, he may prevail on appeal only if admission of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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photographs was plain error.
P.2d 512 (1968).

State v. Poef 21 Utah 2d 113, 441

It is again important to consider that

defendant stated on the record that he had no objection to
admission of one of the photographs.

Such a waiver should stand

even in the face of a claim of plain error.
Even if admission of both photographs was plain error,
it was harmless given the evidence of guilt produced at trial.
Plain error is reversible only where there is a reasonable
likelihood of a different result without the error.
Bishop, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 30 (filed Feb. 3, 1988).

State v.
A

reasonable likelihood is established where the likelihood of a
different result is sufficiently high to undermine this Court's
confidence in the verdict.

Jd.

In this case, the evidence

pointing to defendant's guilt included his own statements that he
was present at Stewart's on the night of his death and that he
wanted to "go ahead and do it again" to Neil Shock.

The evidence

of the degree of the crime included evidence of intentional
murder in that Stewart was tied such that he was completely
unable to flee the burning house, that a large quantity of
flammable liquid was used to ignite the fire, and that a portion
of Stewart's arm was missing from his body.

Given this evidence,

there is little likelihood the jury would have reached a
different result without the photographs.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ADMIT CHARACTER
EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE.
Defendant argues in Points II and III of his brief that
the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his bad character
to show that he had a propensity to commit murder by arson.
Defendant's analysis of what occurred at trial and the nature of
the evidence actually admitted is flawed in several respects.
His first complaint is that the State offered evidence
of a burglary, known as the Goodwin burglary, that occurred on
the same day Stewart died.
evidence of this crime.

However, the State did not offer

Prior to trial, defendant moved to sever

all other charges against him, including the Goodwin burglary,
from the first degree murder charge (R. 700). Initially, the
trial court severed only a burglary charge known as the Snow
Basin burglary that occurred several days prior to the Stewart
murder (R. 712-13).

After jury selection had begun, but before

the parties had exercised their peremptory challenges, the judge
announced that he was reconsidering the motion to sever (R. 730).
After some discussion about the State's theory of the case, the
judge indicated that he would sever the other charges so that
they would not be read to the jury but the State could introduce
whatever evidence was relevant to the first degree murder charge
even if it was also evidence of another crime (R. 737-39).
During his opening statement, the prosecutor explained
the State's theory of the case including a reference to the
Goodwin burglary.

It was the State's theory that defendant and

his co-defendant obtained the gun they used at the Stewart home
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and at the Shock home from the Goodwin burglary earlier in the
day.

(See Appendix A.)

The State did not later, however,

present any testimony or other evidence regarding the source of
the gun or make any further reference to the Goodwin burglary.
The prosecutor told the jury that his opening statement was not
evidence to be considered by them in deciding the case (R. 741).
Since the State did not offer evidence of the Goodwin burglary,
the issue is really whether the prosecutor committed prejudicial
misconduct by referring to the Goodiwn burglary in his opening
statement when no evidence of the burglary was offered during
trial.

This issue is treated in Point IV, infra.
Defendant's second complaint is the following exchange

during direct examination of Officer Terry Carpenter:
Q [By Mr. Hughes] Let me go back to where we
were coming down the canyon. Can you outline
for me the esssence of that conversation,
what was said; what was asked and what the
responses were?
A. The essence of it initially, the only
thing that Mr. Rocco knew about that, he was
willing to tell us about, was a burglary that
occurred at Nordic Valley and Snow Basin Ski
Resorts. He told us about that.
(R. 1429.)

Defendant immediately objected and moved for a

mistrial which the court took under advisement (R. 1429-36).
Defendant renewed the motion after the close of the State's case
(R. 1494) and the court denied the motion (R. 1505).
While it is true that Judge Gould ruled that these
particular burglaries were inadmissible and irrelevant, the issue
here is whether the State offered evidence that defendant
committed these crimes and whether defendant was prejudiced by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

what the jury heard.

The trial judge ruled that he did not feel

that the jury was improperly influenced by Officer Carpenter's
statement.

It was not asserted before the jury that defendant

committed these crimes, only that he said he knew something about
them.

The jury could easily have inferred only that defendant

had information about these crimes that he was willing to share
with the officers.

This does not necessarily lead to a

conclusion that defendant committed the crimes.

It was not,

therefore, a clear abuse of discretion to deny defendant's motion
for a mistrial.

C.f. State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 753 (Utah

1982) (references to debt owed by defendant to State Narcotics
did not unduly prejudice jury to perceive defendant as hardened
criminal).
Finally, defendant argues that evidence of his
subsequent bad acts committed at Neil Shock's home and evidence
that Mr. Shock's car was burned should have been excluded as
"unreliable" evidence.

(Br. of App. at 13-14).

Defendant

admits, however, that former Utah Rule of Evidence 55 allowed the
admission of evidence "to prove some other material fact
including absence of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity."

The burglary

of Mr. Shock's home, the burning of his bed after he was bound
with electrical wire and lying near the bed, and the burning of
his vehicle were highly probative of defendant's guilt in this
case.
Combined with defendant's own statement that he
i

suggested going to Shock's home and that he wanted to go and "do
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it again,H the evidence tying defendant to the burning of Shock's
home after he was bound with electrical cord was relevant to
demonstrate that defendant knew what happened to Stewart and, in
fact, participated intentionally rather than that he was unaware
what Hansen was doing and wanted to save Stewart as defendant
claimed.

Because the probative value of the evidence was

extremely high, the trial court properly ruled that the potential
prejudice was outweighed by the probative value under former Utah
Rule of Evidence 45.
The burning of Shock's car in the canyon after the
burglaries was admissible as "circumstantial evidence of
consciousness of guilt...." which was accepted by this Court in
State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 65 (Utah 1983) citing McCormick's
Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 271 (2d ed. 1972).

Defendant's

admission that he participated in this activity was evidence from
which the jury could infer that defendant wa aware of and
intended the result of the fire set earlier in the evening at
Stewart's home and that he was attempting to destroy evidence
that would have implicated him in that crime.

Thus, the trial

court properly admitted this evidence.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO INSTRUCT
THE JURY ON THE PURPOSE OF THE ADMISSION OF
RULE 55 EVIDENCE AND, THEREFORE, COMMITTED NO
ERROR BY FAILING TO GIVE SUCH AN ADMONITION.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing
to restrict the admission of certain evidence allegedly admitted
as an exception to former Rule 55 Utah R. Evid. (1981).

However,

defendant fails to cite to the record to support this assignment
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of error or to demonstrate that he preserved the issue for
appeal•

Defendant omits all record reference to any particular

evidence which he finds objectionable, referring to such evidence
under the general rubric of "exception to Rule 55 evidence."

In

addition, while defendant claims that he raised objections and
requested restrictions to the admissibility of such evidence, he
fails to cite to the record in support of such assertions.
Under these circumstances, this Court should assume the
correctness of the trial court's judgment and affirm defendant's
conviction.

State v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986);

State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986); State v. Sutton, 707
P.2d 681, 683 (Utah 1985); Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(6).

Because

"[t]he burden of showing error is on the party who seeks to upset
the judgment," State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982),
the State should not be put to the task of developing defendant's
legal arguments by searching through the record and making
references thereto in support of defendant's factual allegations.
The obligation to direct the Court to pertinent parts of the
record falls upon defendant, not the State.
Even if, in spite of his failure to cite to the record
and specify the factual basis for his claim, this Court reviews
defendant's argument, defendant fails to show where the trial
court's error lies.

Defendant does not argue that the evidence

in question was inadmissible.

On the contrary, defendant

acknowledges that it falls within former Rule 55 Utah R. Evid.
(1981) (in force at the time of trial).

Defendant's contention

is that the trial court should have admonished the jury, at the
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time the evidence was introduced, that such evidence was
admissible only for a limited purpose.
Rule 55 permits the introduction of evidence of a
party's criminal wrongs committed on another occasion so long as
it is relevant to establish a material fact of the present
offense and it is introduced for purposes other than to show the
party's criminal disposition.

Utah R. Evid. Rule 55 (1981);

State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Utah 1982).

Nothing in

the rule requires that the trial court admonish or restrict the
jury as to the purpose of admitting the evidence.

Nor is there

Utah case law in support of defendant's contentions.
Defendant finds support for his position in Montana
case law which imposes a strict procedural check on the admission
of evidence under Rule 404(6) Mont. R. Evid., which is in essence
identical to Utah R. Evid. 55 (1981).

However, Montana's strict

requirement derives from an interpretation of the rule which is
diametrically opposed to this Court's interpretation of the same
rule.

State v. Just, 602 P.2d 957 (Mont. 1979) interpreted Rule

404(b) Mont. R. Evid. by incorporating Montana's common law
principles regarding the admissibility of evidence of a party's
bad acts as follows:
Generally, evidence of other offenses or of
other similar acts at other times is
inadmissible for the purpose of showing the
commission of the particular crime.
...
The general rule, however, is subject to
several exceptions.
Id. at 960 (citations omitted).

Based on this interpretation of

the rule, Montana's general rule is one of exclusion of such
evidence.

Thus in Just the Court stated:
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We are concerned, nevertheless, with the
possibility that the exceptions . . . may
"swallow up" the general rule . . . As we
have stated: "The general rule should be
strictly enforced in all cases where
applicable • . . The exceptions should be
carefully limited/ and their number and scope
not increased."
Id. at 962 (citations omitted).

Therefore, based on its general

policy to restrict the introduction of evidence which constitutes
an exception to the rule, the Supreme Court of Montana requires
that the court admonish and instruct the jury of the limited
purpose of evidence of a party's bad acts.
Utah does not share Montana's general policy of
restriction and therefore/ this Court need not adopt the same
strict procedural checks on the introduction of Rule 55 evidence.
In State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Utah 1982), this Court
interpreted Rule 55 Utah R. Evid. (1981) as follows:
Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence . . .
has syntax at odds with its substance. Its
syntax suggests a general rule followed by
exceptions, but an examination of its
substance reveals an exception followed by a
general rule followed by illustrations.
Consequently, Utah's general policy with regard to the
admission of other offenses evidence differs from Montana's.
Forsyth, this Court reaffirmed Utah's policy of inclusion as
follows:
Any pertinent fact which throws light upon
the subject under judicial consideration, the
accused's guilt or innocence of the crime for
which he is charged is admissible. Such fact
is not to be excluded merely because it may
also prove or tend to prove that the accused
has committed another similar crime.
Relevant and material evidence does not
become irrelevant or immaterial merely
because it points to other offenses.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-18-

In

J^. at 1175 (citing from State v. Harries, 118 Utah 260, 283-284,
221 P.2d 605, 617 (1950)).
Contrary to Montana's interpretation, this Court has
interpreted Rule 55 Utah R. Evid. (1980) as a rule of inclusion
favoring presentation of other criminal or civil wrongs to
establish guilt or innocence of the charged offense.

Therefore,

absent any statutory or case authority requirement, the trial
court did not err by not admonishing the jury to restrict the
purpose of the evidence in question.
Finally, defendant's reliance on State v. Valdez, 432
P.2d 53 (Utah 1967) is unfounded.

In that case, the defendant

argued that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury
as to the limited consideration of the evidence of other
offenses, in addition to the court's admonition to the jury at
the time of introduction.

There this Court held that generally

the admonition was sufficient.

Id. at 55.

The Court did not

hold that such admonition is necessary.
Defendant also claims he could not request a limiting
jury instruction because the trial court had not previously
admonished the jury on the limited use of the evidence.

This

claim has no merit and is merely an attempt to avoid the waiver
applied by this Court in Valdez.

Defendant clearly could have

requested such an instruction and his failure to do so waives his
objection on appeal.
In conclusion, defendant has failed to set forth any
grounds for error in the trial court's failure to admonish the
jury as to the restricted purpose for which the evidence was
admitted.

Therefore;
this
Court
should
affirm
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POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD NOT BE REVERSED
FOR PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT WHERE DEFENDANT
WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY ANY ALLEGED MISCONDUCT.
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor failed to
exercise the "scrupulous care" required by State v. Brown/ 607
P.2d 261# 271 (Utah 1980) in capital cases.

He urges that this

failure prejudiced him but does not acknowledge that he admitted
being at Stewart's home the night of Stewart's death# knowing
that the Stewart home was engulfed by flames when he left,
wanting to "go ahead and do it again" at Neil Shocks', and
helping to conceal evidence of the crime spree by burning Shock's
car (R. 1450-51/ 1456-57).

These factors demonstrate that/

although the prosecutor went somewhat overboard in his argument
in reference to the photographs and should not have mentioned the
Goodwin burglary if he did not plan to present proof of the
conduct/ defendant was not unfairly prejudiced.
First/ defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the
prosecutor's opening statement which mentioned that the gun used
during the Stewart murder was obtained through burglarizing the
Goodwin home earlier in the day.

Concededly/ there seems to have

been no reason that the State needed to prove where the gun was
obtained to prove that Hansen carried one and that defendant knew
it since defendant/ in his own statement/ admitted that Hansen
had a gun.

However/ the jury was told that the prosecutor's

statement was not evidence (R. 741). It is unlikely from what
the prosecutor said that the jury was biased since they did not
impose the death penalty and defendant's own statement implicates
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him in the murder.

Thus, the fact that the Goodwin burglary was

something the jury would not have been justified in considering
is insufficient for reversal because it does not undermine
confidence in the jury's verdict.

State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d

1239, 1255 (Utah 1988).
Next, defendant complains about Officer Burch's
description of the circumstances surrounding defendant's arrest.
He urges that the jury was impressed that defendant was a "very
dangerous and bad person, even though there were no circumstances
apparent in the arrest that would substantiate the probativeness
of such testimony."

(Br. of App. at 22.). He does not explain

what exactly were the prejudicial matters described by Burch.
Given defendant's failure of specificity, his claim is specious.
No doubt, the prosecutor elicited testimony about the
circumstances of the arrest to establish a foundation for the
voluntariness of defendant's statements made while riding away
from the arrest scene. An issue that was challenged by defendant
(See R. 1298-1324, specifically R. 1308).
Thirdly, defendant asserts that there was misconduct in
the prosecutor's rebuttal argument when he apparently displayed a
photograph of Stewart, alive and well, and contrasted it with one
of the photographs taken of Stewart's corpse. As this Court
noted in Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1258, several courts have
recognized that the probative value of photographs showing the
victim before death is often weak.

In this case, however, the

photograph was harmless because, as discussed above, there was
overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt as there was in
Lafferty.
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Finally, defendant complains that the State failed to
offer the trial court guidance on the issue of severance of the
crimes charged.

It is difficult to see what defendant's point is

in this regard because the judge did sever the charges for trial
and defendant was not, therefore, prejudiced by joinder in the
information.

Because the evidence of some of these offenses was

relevant and highly probative of defendant's mental state at the
Stewart home, it was properly admitted at trial even though the
court determined that the charges should be separately tried as
argued in Point II above.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to affirm defendant's conviction.
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what happened in the life of Joe Rocco from the evening of
February 1st until the morning of February 3rd of this year.
What we are going to be demonstrating for you is that on
February 1st he got off work as a ski lift operator at Snow
Basin, and drove down the canyon with another man named David
Hansen.

You will hear a lot about David Hansen before the

trial is over as well.

Sometime in the early evening Joe Rocco

and David Hansen ended up at the Billy Goodwin residence in Roy.|
No one was home.

The door was kicked in.

The two men took

guns, they took property, money, miscellaneous other items
and left.

They ultimately ended up at a place in Riverdale.
MR. DIUMENTI:

Your Honor, for the record, I object

to counsel's reference to the Goodwin matter during opening
statement.
THE COURT:
MR. HUGHES:

Noted and overruled.
They ended up in Riverdale, the home of

a man named David Stewart.
You will learn a lot about David Stewart before the trial ijs
over as well.

At that residence, I am not sure if you are

familiar with the Classic Waterslide, or where the viaduct goes
over Riverdale Road, there is a couple of homes back down
that dirt road.

Some of you may be familiar with the area,

the old Sherwood Forest area.
there.

They arrived there.

David Stewart occupied a home

Mr. Stewart was bound by electrical]

wire, was bound—his feet were bound by the electric wire, and

54
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

